10 · The record
Hand it to someone who has no reason to trust you.
What the firm produces carries its own proof: a manifest a recipient checks offline, a digest anyone can look up with no account, and ledgers that disclose their own losses.
A digest proves an artifact existed. It never proves nothing was withheld.
The question in the room
“Opposing counsel does not take my word for it. What can I give them?”
How it works
The mechanism, not the promise.
A published specification
ShippedAn exported filing carries source hashes, spans and verdicts under a specification a recipient can read.
verifier/SPEC.md
A verifier the recipient runs offline
ShippedOpenly licensed, so checking the work does not require trusting the tool that produced it.
verifier/LICENSE
A digest lookup with no account
ShippedAnyone can check a hash. The answer discloses no matter, no party, no title and no filename.
backend/src/routes/attest.ts
Four hash-chained ledgers, anchored externally
ShippedThey are different claims, and no surface renders them with the same tick.
backend/src/lib/chainVerify.ts
Removals disclosed inside the chain
ShippedTwo ledgers really were truncated in a hand-run purge. The disclosure is a row in the firm's own anchored chain, so it cannot be backdated or made anonymous.
backend/src/lib/ledgerDisclosure.ts
The Warrant
ShippedOne primitive for a machine decided this, and here is why, replacing several shapes of the same idea.
backend/src/lib/provenance/warrant.ts
A grounded-read contract for the firm's own AI
ShippedEvery read answer carries the rows it came from, how far those rows were checked, and the timestamp of the data rather than of the response.
backend/src/mcp/index.ts
One write verb that cannot act
ShippedAn outside model can file a proposal for a human to approve. It is never issued a confirmation token and cannot approve its own proposal.
backend/src/mcp/proposeAction.ts
Privilege bound to the credential
ShippedThe access class is per-key governance rather than a request argument, because a model is exactly the caller that cannot be trusted to set a privilege flag correctly.
backend/src/lib/mcpAuth/consent.ts
A firm export that is a migration, not a download
Backend onlyDocument bytes, canonical tables, the audit chain and a manifest. Backend available, with no export screen yet.
backend/src/routes/firmExport.ts
Refusals
What it will not do, and why.
- Say the record is whole.
- A digest proves an artifact existed at a time. It can never prove that nothing was withheld, and the attestation route refuses that claim explicitly.
- Answer a ledger tip through the public door.
- The public lookup returns a uniform not-found, so it cannot be used as an oracle to probe what the firm holds.
- Render a ledger short of rows as healthy.
- An earlier external receipt can expose a shorter history, and a truncated chain never renders the same green as a whole one.
One record
Nothing here stands on its own.
What feeds it
- Every draft, decision, prediction and posting
- The citation gate's verdicts
- Disclosed removals
What it feeds
- Opposing counsel
- A court or a clerk
- An auditor or a carrier
- The firm's own AI
Limits
What this does not establish.
- Automatic attestation on export ships switched off behind a named flag.
- The public calibration scoreboard ships switched off behind a named flag and has nothing to publish.
- Anchoring proves a time of existence. It is not a blockchain, and no funds or tokens move.
Check the work before you believe it.
Run a sample manifest in your own browser, or read where publication refuses for want of evidence.